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Abstract
The United States identifies the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction particularly nuclear weapons as 
the greatest potential threat to global security m the post Cold War era Despite a considerable emphasis m this 
area, only South Afinca has voluntarily rolled back its nuclear weapons capability ( Nuclear rollback occurs 
when a nation eliminates its nuclear weapons relinquishes at least some of the technical means to acquire 
nuclear weapons or accepts a control regime to prevent it from gomg nuclear ) Unfortunately South Africa s 
actions apparently came m spite of U S nonproliferation measures
The primary focus of this paper is the impact of key South African leaders on the successful development 
and subsequent rollback of South Afinca s nuclear weapons capability It highlights the key milestones in the 
development of South Africa s nuclear weapons capability It also relates how different groups within South 
Africa (scientists politicians militaiy and technocrats) interacted to successfully produce South Africa s 
nuclear deterrent It emphasizes the pivotal influence of the senior political leadership to pursue nuclear rollback 
given the disadvantages of its nuclear means to achieve vital national interests
The conclusions drawn from this effort are that the South African nuclear program was an extreme response 
to its own identity cnsis Nuclear weapons became a means of achievmg a long term end of a closer 
affiliation with the West A South Africa yearning to be identified as a Western nation—and receive guarantees 
of its security—rationalized the need for a nuclear deterrent The deterrent was mtended to draw m Western 
support to counter a feared ‘total onslaught by communist forces in the region Two decades later that same 
South Africa relinquished its nuclear deterrent—and reformed its domestic policies to secure improved 
economic and political integration with the West
Several recommendations are offered for critical review of the above issues to mclude the need for greater 
mtemational dialogue and constructive engagement with threshold nations such as India and Pakistan 
Nonproliferation regimes can be used to promote mutual verification transparency and the resolution of mutual 
security concerns More than anything policy makers must be prepared to assist threshold nuclear states m 
resolving their core regional security concerns if they wish to encourage states to pursue nuclear rollback
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Introduction
Too small to be picked up by radar the South African bomb arched up to twelve thousand meters before 
descending in a gentle curve across the ten kilometers between its release point and target
After fierce debate Pretorias mission planners had picked the Cuban T 62 tank battalion as their 
primary target Ordinarily two battalion strongpoints could have been included in the bomb s inner kill 
zone but the tanks represented most o f  the Third Brigade Tactical Group s combat power The planners 
were willing to accept minimal damage to the rear o f  the column in order to guarantee destruction o f the 
Cuban armor
Fused fo r  airburst it detonated over and just outside the northwest edge o f the tank battalion s 
laager A boiling white hot fireball more than two hundred meters in diameter speared through the 
night—turning darkness into flickering man made day fo r several deadly seconds
The two forward battalions in the Third Brigade Tactical Group were wiped out in one swift merciless 
moment The middle two battalions lasted only five seconds longer Ten seconds after the South African 
fission bomb went o ff the brigade s fifth  and final motor rifle battalion lay shattered in its debris choked 
laager
Several thousand men lay dead or dying among the hundreds o f  wrecked vehicles littering Route 47 
Gen Antonio Vega s Third Tactical Group had been annihilated
Larry Bond Vortex
Lariy Bond s vision of a South Africa using nuclear weapons to stop a large scale Cuban combined arms 
assault m the novel Vortex is eerily similar to the original purpose Pretona claimed as the dnving requirement 
for its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent In reality South Africa s leadership feared just such a Cuban assault m the 
late-1980s at the height of tensions with Angola and Namibia With more than 50 000 Cuban troops along its 
border South Africa faced its worst nightmare the potential for a total onslaught by communist forces that 
the South African Defense Force (SADF) could not overcome South Africa reportedly targeted the Angolan 
capital city of Luanda with a nuclear weapon m order to precipitate Western intervention mto the conflict had 
the Cubans mvaded 1 Instead the United States and the Soviet Union helped Angola Namibia, and South 
Africa reach a negotiated settlement that achieved the withdrawal of both Cuban and South African militaiy 
forces from the conflict area Unlike the novel South Africa s insurance policy 2 agamst a breakdown m the 
peace negotiations led to a successful outcome by securing Western intervention without a smgle nuclear 
detonation
Just over a year after securing regional stability with its insurance policy South Africa became the first 
nation m history to ever rollback its nuclear capability Nuclear rollback occurs when a nation voluntarily 
achieves one or more of the following eliminates its nuclear weapons relinquishes at least some of the 
technical means to acquire nuclear weapons or accepts a control regime to prevent it from gomg nuclear This 
paper looks at South Africa s nuclear rollback m terms of how its leadership exerted pivotal influence over its 
deterrent program from birth to dismantlement The central question it addresses is how did the national 
identity technical capabilities and regional security issues coalesce mto a nuclear deterrent for the Republic of 
South Africa (RSA) and what prompted its dismantlement9
I contend nuclear weapons were an extreme expression of South Africa s desire to be linked to the West 
This created a challenge for U S foreign policy m balancing its opposition to apartheid (racial separateness) and 
the need to support nuclear nonproliferation U S policy focused on pressurmg the Republic of South Africa s 
nuclear program to achieve leverage for concessions on nonproliferation and domestic policy reform This 
policy missed the chief objective of the RSA s mterest in pursuing a nuclear deterrent It focused on the 
symptoms of South Africa s identity crisis (for example unsafeguarded nuclear program and apartheid) not its 
root causes (desire for Western security guarantees)
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The paper is divided into four sections The first describes the key milestones m the birth life and 
dismantlement of the South African nuclear program The next section describes the dynamics of how a small 
core of leadership directed the actions of the program m concert with a much broader objective The third 
section offers an explanation for why dismantlement was consistent with South Africa s long term interests m 
seekmg a close affiliation to the West The final section discusses how the RSA nuclear program demonstrates 
the profound challenge to U S policymakers of achievmg the proper policy balance to engage threshold nuclear 
states on proliferation issues For the purposes of this paper the nuclear program is broadly divided mto an 
early middle and end phase The phases roughly correspond with the initial development penod from the 
1950s until 1977 the development and production of deliverable nuclear weapons from 1977 until 1989 and 
the end phase from 1989 until its public acknowledgement m 1993
The Program Begins
We can ascribe our degree o f advancement today in large measure to the training and assistance so  
willingly provided by the United States o f America during the early years o f  our programme
A J Roux (Frank V Pabian South Africa s Nuclear Weapons Program )
South Africa s quest for a nuclear deterrent capability required the acquisition of at least four basic elements 
raw materials (uranium or plutonium) the ability to ennch the materials to weapons grade trained personnel 
and adequate facilities and the capability to acquire or manufacture components required for the nuclear device 
The early days of South Africa s nuclear program focused on civilian nuclear applications the development of 
reactors for research and power production and the enrichment of uranium for reactor fuel The details of this 
early phase are well documented However the critical bomb production stage of the program remams clouded 
by official South African government reluctance to reveal specifics and the destruction of virtually all files 
related to the nuclear program Table 1 at the end of this section summarizes key milestones m the RSA nuclear 
weapons program
The acquisition of raw matenals was easy South Africa s pursuit of cheap nuclear energy was based on its 
abundant supply of natural uranium resources In fact, South Africa established itself as a uranium supplier to 
the U S nuclear weapons program (and subsequently the United Kmgdom s program) during the closmg days 
of World War I I 3 Accordmg to Richard Betts South Africa provided approximately 40 000 tons of uranium 
oxide to the United States valued at approximately $450 million4 In return South Africa sent more than 
ninety of its scientists and technicians for training at U S nuclear research installations5 and began its own 
civilian nuclear research and development program for peaceful uses of nuclear explosives The United States 
also agreed to supply South Africa with a nuclear research reactor (SAFARI I ) 6 tram additional scientists and 
reactor technicians and provide fuel for the reactor under an agreement reached m 1957 These arrangements 
provided South Africa with a firm foundation to conduct its civilian nuclear research and development (R&D) 
program The flow of personnel equipment and fuel under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards contmued up until 1976 when the United States halted its support m response to South Africa s 
refusal to sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)7
Early Phase
The success of South Africa s civilian research coupled with its mterest m usmg nuclear reactors for power 
production prompted work on uranium enrichment8 The need to produce 45 percent enriched uranium for its 
SAFARI I reactor led to the construction of the Y Plant a pilot uranium enrichment plant at Valmdaba9 This 
facility is adjacent to the Pelmdaba Nuclear Research Center located approximately 35 kilometers west of 
Pretona The plant used a unique aerodynamic process to separate the U 235 from the U 238 South Africa 
frequently cited the need to keep the process propnetary as the rationale for blockmg mtemational mspections of 
the ennchment plant10
Parallel to the fuel ennchment efforts South Africa embarked on research mto peaceful nuclear explosives 
(PNEs) In 1969 the Atomic Energy Board (AEB)" formed a group to evaluate the technical and economic 
aspects of nuclear explosives 12 In 1971 then Minister of Mines Carl De Wet secretly approved work on 
preliminary investigations mto producing nuclear explosives 13 No actual development work was conducted 
the work was limited to theoretical investigations and literature searches on the feasibility of both implosion 
and gun type nuclear devices
The Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) gave priority to work on the mechanical and pyrotechmcal aspects 
of gun type designs (similar to the U S atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima) over work on an implosion 
design 14 The gun type design likely gamed favor because it satisfied South African safety concerns contamed 
no plutonium 15 used no high explosives (reduced risk of accidental detonation) and accommodated a separable 
design (could be stored m sections for added safety and security) 16 An additional mcentive may have been that 
a gun type design did not necessarily require a live test to validate the design 17 In 1974 Prime Mmister
3
4 Col Roy E  Horton III
Balthazar J Vorster authorized the nuclear program to proceed under the aegis of peaceful uses (for example 
large excavations harbors mmes and so forth) and approved the funding of a test site m the Kalahari Desert to 
quantify the results of their theoretical work Despite the peaceful nature of all these investigations South 
African officials cloaked the program m extreme secrecy 18
Despite the secrecy visitors to South Africa during the 1970s report the AEC scientists were proud of their 
efforts and pnvately revealed their nuclear research 19 They found the scientists to be well trained and pursuing 
their work with an attitude of wanting to show the world what South Africa can do 20 Many during this early 
stage had studied abroad but m later years the opportunities for overseas training and contact through 
mtemational conferences were severely reduced This likely contributed to a highly parochial worldview on their 
part but does not appear to have impeded their technical skills m refinmg the gun type design
The Aborted 1977 TestI
South Africa proceeded from theory to practice with the construction of a nuclear test site From 1975-76 
engmeers successfully drilled two test shafts more than 250 meters deep for conducting nuclear tests at the 
Vastrap military base located within the Kalahari Desert The AEC planned the 1977 test to validate the nuclear 
device s design less its highly enriched uranium (HEU) core (also referred to as a cold test)21 In the aftermath 
of India s nuclear test m 1974 South African leaders were confident there would be little or no long term 
mtemational outrage more than an overt declaration by detonation of its capability to produce nuclear 
explosives While the effort to develop nuclear explosives was considered a state secret no attempt was made to 
conceal the supporting test infrastructure equipment and facilities The AEC had completed the test device 
descnbed as a monster5 by 197722 Some reporting mdicates the AEC planned to conduct a second test 
approximately one year later with a real HEU core following a successful cold test23
We did indeed receive information that South Africa was preparing for an atomic explosion which 
according to the South African authorities was for peaceful purposes We know what a peaceful atomic 
explosion is however it is not possible to distinguish between a peaceful atomic explosion and an atomic 
explosion for purposes of military nuclear testing We therefore warned South Africa that we would regard 
such testing as endangering all the peace processes under way and as having a potentially serious 
consequences with respect to our relationship with South Africa 24
Unfortunately W  South Africa a Soviet surveillance satellite detected the preparations for a nuclear test in 
August 1977 and Soviet authorities immediately notified the United States While denymg such a test was 
imminent South Africa was forced to cancel its planned test m the face of strongly worded demarches from 
several nations mcludmg the United States the Soviet Union and France25 The abrupt cancellation of the test 
transformed South Africa s existmg program from the exploration of nuclear explosives to the development of a 
viable nuclear deterrent This led to a shift m program management from the AEC to the South African 
Armaments Corporation (ARMSCOR)26 The original nuclear test article was reportedly more than three metric 
tons m weight butiAEC scientists succeeded m reducmg the size of the device by a factor of five27
The “Double Flash of ’79 ’
On 22 September 1979 a U S surveillance satellite detected a brief but mtense double flash of light 
emanating from an area over the South Atlantic near the Cape28 Coming less than two years after South Africa 
was forced to stand down its nuclear test m the Kalahari Desert it brought mcreased attention on South Africa 
and the extent of cooperation with a close ally Israel Although it quickly denied it had conducted a test 
rumors persist until the present day about possible South African involvement in a nuclear test Analysis of its 
HEU production29 mdicates the RSA could not have produced sufficient weapons grade uranium m time to 
support a test Suspicions voiced at the time of the event pointed toward Israel as the source of the device tested 
with South Africa playmg only a limited supporting ro le30 Recent press reporting appears to confirm these 
suspicions although understandably neither party is willing to confirm their involvement m the test31
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Nuclear Weapons Related Facilities
The transition from a nuclear device to a nuclear deterrent led to a significant improvement m the facilities 
supporting the RSA nuclear program The program essentially occupied four sets of facilities over the life of the 
program Initially the AEC secretly worked on the nuclear program m downtown Pretona, but then moved to 
the Pelmdaba Nuclear Research Center m the mid 1960s At Pelmdaba, the AEC designed and produced the 
initial nuclear device and a second smaller device32 AEC scientists reportedly conducted their one and only 
cntical test for the HEU core used m South Africa s weapons at Pelmdaba33 Pelmdaba also had facilities for 
machmmg high explosives (HE) for implosion weapons and for supporting testmg and firing sites AEC 
personnel monitored the production of HEU and contmued advanced weapons design research for the remamder 
of the nuclear program—with the latter at a much slower rate and very low priority 34
The transfer of nuclear weapons production responsibility to ARMSCOR led to the construction of the 
Kentron Circle facility (later named Advena) located approximately 20 kilometers west of Pretona ARMSCOR 
was made up of engmeers vice physicists and therefore proceeded with the development and production of 
deliverable nuclear weapons based on the gun type design in a businesslike and unimaginative way 35 The 
Circle facility constructed m 1980 and commissioned in May 1981 comprised two innocuous looking 
buildings located deep mside the boundaries of an ARMSCOR complex used for high speed vehicle testmg on 
vanous road surfaces36 The Circle facility was also well equipped to conduct work on implosion weapons with 
a capability to develop test diagnostics HE test cells to perfect explosives placement for proper core 
compression and metal machmmg equipment for the cores37 However ARMSCOR engmeers focused the bulk 
of their efforts on producmg a highly reliable gun type device and never altered the original physics package 
design provided by the AEC 38 ARMSCOR never placed a high priority on advanced weapon designs—despite 
extensive if slow research—until it became a possible means to extend the life of the program
ARMSCOR successfully lobbied the government in the mid 1980s to construct the final major weapons 
related facility Advena Central Laboratories Work began on construction of the facility to expand nuclear 
delivery options to ballistic missiles This new facility appeared to be well equipped to accelerate work on 
advanced warhead designs and provided the capability to mate nuclear warheads to ballistic missiles39 A 
collaborative effort with Israel was already underway to develop an intermediate range ballistic missile 
(ostensibly a space launch program based on the Jericho II with a maximum range of approximately 2000 
kilometers)40 The SADF believed a ballistic missile capability was necessary to counter the mcreasmg 
vulnerability of its agmg Buccaneer aircraft to Cuban air defenses41
The Advena facility was completed just as the RSA nuclear program was terminated The additional 
production and research capacity of the Advena facility could have mcreased weapons production and 
simultaneously mcreased the pace of work on advanced warhead designs42 ARMSCOR had set the goal of 
upgrading the nuclear arsenal by the year 2000 when the decision was made to terminate the program Advanced 
warhead designs such as implosion weapons and even boosted fission designs (to increase the yield from 15-20 
kilotons to as much as 100 kilotons) were bemg reviewed as part of the stockpile upgrade plan43
Access to Critical Technology and Components
As noted earlier foreign assistance was critical to the South African nuclear program during the 1970s In 
addition the absence of uniformly enforced nonproliferation controls during the 1960s and early 1970s worked 
m their favor as well Accordmg to a declassified CIA esimiate ‘the South Africans have had little difficulty 
acquiring matenals and technology essential to their nuclear weapons development program 44 South Africa 
had already acquired the key components needed for its fuel ennchment process and basic nuclear explosive 
work by the time the Carter administration moved to tighten export controls limit training of personnel and 
cutoff the supply of nuclear fuel45 In addition the United States applied these controls unilaterally many 
European nations contmued to supply equipment to South Africa46
South Africa s choice of a conservative gun type design lends itself to a low tech solution that was 
relatively unimpeded by nonproliferation controls Where equipment could not be obtained South African 
technicians relied on creative solutions or modified uncontrolled items to serve their requirements In one 
instance the Y Plant s ennchment process design required the indigenous development of a reliable seal for use
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between two sets of rotating machineiy47 In another case ARMSCOR technicians used a two axis machme to 
create the complex three dimensional shapes needed to fabricate parts of the gun type device48
The AEC and ARMSCOR personnel were also consistently aware of the need to maintain a low profile 
to avoid the attention of Western intelligence services The acquisition of cntical materials and dual use 
supplies was done through a variety of suppliers and m small quantities to reduce chances of detection South 
Africans tacitly acknowledge circumventing export controls to obtain selected items but understandably refuse 
to name the source or methods used to acquire these items 49 As Frank Pablan notes the overall impact of 
nonproliferation controls m effect when South Africa developed its weapons was to slow production and work 
on advanced designs by making it harder to acquire components and supplies m a consistent fashion 50
The United States and the mtemational community also succeeded m reducing South Africa s prestige m 
the mtemational nuclear arena In 1977 South Africa was removed from its seat on the IAEA Board of 
Governors and replaced by Egypt The seat was reserved for the most advanced nuclear country in Africa 51 and 
South Africans felt it had been unfairly taken from them To add insult to injury South Africa was refused 
participation m the 1979 IAEA General Conference m an attempt to compel it to jom the NPT Ironically the 
conference was bemg held m New Delhi India AEC Chief Executive Officer Waldo Stumpf noted India had 
detonated a nuclear explosive refused to sign the NPT and yet they were not suffering a similar pariah status 
bemg levied upon South Africa52
Building the Weapons
In spite of these restrictions ARMSCOR personnel established a nuclear weapons production Ime at their 
Circle facility The AEC had produced a second device m late 1979 at Pelmdaba but it was suitable only for 
use m a test and was not deliverable 53 ARMSCOR completed its first pre production model m 1982 but this 
model was only deliverable by kickmg it out the back of a plane 54 ARMSCOR engmeers worked to refine 
the overall weapon design m terms of safety reliability and security while holdmg the AEC designed and 
validated physics package constant The heavy veil of secrecy surrounding the RSA program small staff (only 
about 35 of the 100 personnel employed at Circle m the early 1980s actually built the weapons) and the need 
to build some items m house slowed the pace of the program 55 The work force grew to approximately 300 
personnel m 1989 with roughly half mvolved with weapons production 56
At the same time the Y Plant was producing the necessary HEU to support the weapons program after 
some initial problems with the production Ime The enrichment process used the centrifugal effect of spinning 
uranium hexafluoride and hydrogen gases mside a tube to separate the heavier uranium 238 fraction from the 
lighter uranium 235 fraction The South Africans fine tuned this process by trial and error over time to 
produce HEU Technical problems plagued the process throughout its operation m one instance a chemical 
contamination forcbd the entire production Ime to shut down from 1979 to 1981 57 The best esimiate places the 
total Y Plant HEU production at 550 kilograms S8
Weapons Details
ARMSCOR mvested heavily in refining and qualifying the various parts of the weapon with an emphasis on 
safety and arming features While the gun type design had the advantage of not usmg explosives59 there were 
still considerable challenges to prevent accidental detonation if the weapon was dropped ARMSCOR engmeers 
developed a unique means of physically preventmg an accidental detonation prior to final arming but the 
mechanical devices mvolved took several years to qualify and eventually proved extremely difficult to 
maintain60 The weapons were stored as two halves m separate vaults as an additional safety feature The design 
was actually divided mto four segments consistmg of an inner nuclear section made up of two parts containing 
the HEU core plus an external two-part non nuclear section for aerodynamic stability and guidance61 
Accordmg to ARMSCOR, the HEU core consisted of two pieces—one piece shaped like a sphere with a hole m 
its middle with the second piece m the shape of a cylmder designed to fit m the hole 62 At detonation the 
cylindrical piece of HEU would be propelled down a high strength gun barrel mto the sphencal piece of HEU to 
generate an estimated yield of 10-18 kilotons63 The production version reportedly weighed approximately 
1000 kilograms had an overall length of 1 8 meters and a diameter of 0 65 meters 64
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The small size of ARMSCOR s actual bomb assembly group their strong emphasis on weapons 
certification and qualification the requirement to indigenously shape and manufacture several bomb 
components and limited supplies of HEU held the production rate to roughly 1-2 weapons per year The final 
inventory at program termination was eight active weapons six operational (five air deliverable one test 
device) one weapon under construction (mtended to be a test device) and one weapon (without an HEU core 
assigned) for training purposes65 Several sources cite the total RSA nuclear inventory at six and a half 
weapons this appears to stem from the exclusion of the training device from the accounting66 A unique feature 
of the ARMSCOR design was an apparent capability to mate the an deliverable warheads to ballistic missiles 
under construction when the program terminated 67 This flexibility could have enabled the South Africans to 
mix and match their limited nuclear stockpile among the available aircraft and ballistic missiles 68
The Kalahari Revisited
The RSA s nuclear program reached full tilt in the 1987-1989 period as the regional security situation turned 
agamst South Africa The early SADF successes agamst Soviet supported Angolan forces were reversed and the 
Soviets were supplymg these forces with superior military equipment 69 Cuban leader Fidel Castro deployed an 
additional 15 000 troops in support of a series of offensive operations along the Angolan-Namibian border area 
He predicted a serious defeat for South African forces should the need arise to launch operations deep into 
Namibia
Fortunately the mcreased Cuban pressure along South Africa s borders and SADF deployments in 
response to the Cuban s presence did not result m any major confrontations The parties agreed to a cease fire in 
August 1988 but Cuban forces remained threateningly close to the RSA s northern borders
The South African leadership responded by carefully playmg their nuclear card to underscore their 
determination not to be overwhelmed and to make it clear to the United States and the Soviet Union that an 
extremely unpleasant alternative to a negotiated settlement was available70 Prime Minister Botha ordered 
ARMSCOR officials to mspect and make ready the abandoned test site m the Kalahari Desert for a possible 
short notice nuclear test 71 Mitchell Reiss reports the South African leaders elected this course of action as a 
means of signaling their resolve to the United States and the Soviet Union over reachmg an acceptable solution 
to the withdrawal of Cuban forces 72
South African Foreign Mmister Pik Botha raised the stakes even further by informing the world press that 
South Africa had the capability to make a nuclear weapon should we want to but refused to provide further 
details73 Whether mtended as a warning or not the comments underscored South Africa s determination not to 
be overrun and to see its border areas secure should peace talks stall The end result was Cuba South Africa 
and Angola formally agreed to Namibia s mdependence and a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban forces m a 
December 1988 agreement Therefore unlike m the novel Vortex South Africa achieved the withdrawal of 
Cuban forces from its border area by enlisting the aid of the United States and the Soviet Union by 
demonstrating but not detonatmg a nuclear weapon
Nuclear Rollback
The withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet supported forces from its border marked the high water mark for the 
RSA s use of its nuclear deterrent ARMSCOR s efforts to breathe new life mto the nuclear program could not 
reverse a declmmg trend m its priority F W de Klerk was elected president of South Africa m September 
1989 when Pieter W Botha was forced to step down because of failing health He immediately took steps to 
begm dismantling South Africa s nuclear arsenal and prepare for the nation s accession to the NPT The 
weapons were dismantled beginning m July 1990 and work was completed by September 1991 with all of the 
HEU removed from the weapons and transported to Pelmdaba for storage74 South Africa signed the NPT on 10 
July 1991 and the nuclear safeguards agreement entered mto force on 16 September 1991 The IAEA began its 
mspections m November 1991 and spent nearly two years reviewmg the full scope of South Africa s nuclear 
program
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It was not until 24 March 1993 that President de Klerk publicly revealed to the Parliament and to the 
world that South Africa had embarked on an ambitious effort to build nuclear devices and had then dismantled 
them Waldo Stumpf estimated the total nuclear deterrent program costs at approximately 680 million Rand 
($500 million)75 over the lifetime of the program Other sources estimate the total cost as closer to 7 billion 
rand ($5 1 billion) (given the nearly one billion rand annually allocated to the AEC at the program s peak76 
These figures may (define the program s size but the truer measure of its effectiveness was its core leadership 
This small group of politicians scientists military personnel and technocrats nurtured the nuclear program 
matured it mto a deterrent capability and finally terminated it when it no longer served their best mterests
Table 1 Key Events m the South African Nuclear Weapons Program77
_______Year___________________________________________  Activity_________
1950s and 1960s Scientific work on the feasibility of peaceful nuclear explosives and support to nuclear power 
production efforts
1969 AEB forms group to evaluate technical and economic aspects of nuclear explosives
1970 AEC releases report identifying wide applications for nuclear explosives
1971 R&D for gun type device approved for peaceful use of nuclear explosives
1973 AEC places research priority on gun type design over implosion and boosted weapon designs
1974 PM Vorster authorizes funding for work on nuclear device and preparation of test site
1977 AEC completes assembly of nuclear device (less HEU core) for cold test in the Kalahari Desert
Soviet Union and United States detect preparations for the nuclear test and pressure South Africa 
into abandoning the test
AEC instructed to miniaturize device groundwork laid for ARMSCOR to take program lead
1978 Y Plant uranium enrichment plant produces first batch of HEU
Three phase strategic guidelines established for nuclear deterrent policy
Botha Action Committee recommends arsenal of seven nuclear weapons and ARMSCOR 
formally assumes control of program
1979 Double flash event detected first device with HEU core produced by AEC
1982 First deliverable device produced by ARMSCOR work continues to improve weapon safety and
reliability
1985 ARMSCOR strategy review expands original three phase strategy to include specific criteria to
transition to next deterrent phase
1987 First production model produced total of seven weapons built with an eighth under
construction at program termination
1988 ARMSCOR revisits Kalahari nuclear test site and erects a large steel hangar over test shafts and
prepares the shafts for a possible nuclear test
Angola, Cuba, and South Africa formally agree on Namibia s independence and schedule for 
Cuban troops to withdraw from Angola
1989 F W de Klerk elected President and orders weapon production halted
1990 Y Plant formally shut down and nuclear weapons dismantlement begins
1991 South Africa signs the NPT and enters into a comprehensive safeguard agreement
1993 President de Klerk publicly discloses details of former South African nuclear deterrent program
The Key Players behind the Program
It is possible that South Africa has leap frogged the testing phase and is concentrating on the 
weaponizing and delivery o f its nuclear explosive device Afrikaners are a contingency minded people and  
as such probably would prefer to have a deliverable nuclear weapon rather than be forced to develop one 
hastily in the face o f a worsening security situation
Central Intelligence Agency78
The ebb and flow of the South African nuclear deterrent effort is all the more remarkable given the small 
number of personnel mvolved (1000 total and no more than 300 at any one penod) and those actually 
responsible for key programmatic decisions (reportedly between six and twelve) The decisions emerged from 
the synthesis of four basic groups—the scientists the politicians the military and the technocrats—who 
shaped the focus and direction of the program The scientific zeal and drive of the AEC s Ampie Roux and 
Wally Grant to demonstrate that South Africa could make a nuclear device established the technical foundation 
for the program 79 Yet their work was not done m isolation from the political leadership the support of the 
military on military to military cooperation matters and the technocrats for actual weapons production
The strong leadership of the ruling Nationalist Party supported the AEC s research during the 1950s and 
1960s before moldmg it mto a key element of national strategy m the 1970s Prime Minister B J Vorster 
presided over the decision to pursue peaceful nuclear explosives and the aborted Kalahari nuclear test His 
successor P W Botha exerted tremendous influence over nearly the entire life of the program He initially 
served as defense minister from 1966-1980 and simultaneously served as defense mmister director of the 
National Intelligence Service and pnme mmister from 1978-198080 In fact President Botha approved the 
recommendation to proceed with development of a seven weapon nuclear deterrent strategy m 1979 81 He also 
streamlined the State Security Council (composed of the Prune Mmister mmisters of defense foreign affairs 
justice and peace and the senior mmister) mto a powerful decision making body for national security issues m 
relative secrecy82
The military exerted strong influence within the State Security Council (SSC) but their role focused 
primarily on domestic security and conventional military operations83 The two defense mmisters overseeing 
the nuclear program were P W Botha and his handpicked successor Gen Magnus Malan Under Botha the 
defense mmister s power was merged with that of the prime mmister s m supporting the nuclear deterrent 
program Under Gen Malan it appears the military s direct influence over the course of the nuclear deterrent 
program was more limited although they remamed engaged at some level as the ultimate customer for nuclear 
weapons
Finally the technocrats—the engineers at ARMSCOR—exerted heavy influence over the nuclear program 
particularly during its critical middle stage ARMSCOR Managing Director Tielman de Waal headed a 
corporation that not only produced nuclear weapons but also established the capability to mate the weapons 
with ballistic missiles 84 There are also indications ARMSCOR was mvolved m more than just producmg 
munitions—it also worked m developmg the nuclear strategy itself Together these four groups formed a 
partnership that conceived produced and then discarded South Africa s nuclear deterrent Yet m the end the 
political leadership exerted the pivotal influence over the program s progress Table 2 illustrates the mcreasmg 
and decreasmg influence exerted by the four groups over the life of the program
Table 2 Relative Influence of Key Players
Level o f  
Influence
Early Phase 
1950S-1977
Mid Phase 
1977-1989
End Phase 
1989-1993
HIGH Politicians & Scientists Politicians & Technocrats Politicians
MEDIUM Military Military Technocrats & Military
LOW Technocrats Scientists Scientists
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Whether or not the West approves South Africa firmly plants itself in the NATO camp dedicated to the 
defense o f the West against its enemies in return the Republic expects the West to come to its defense
Colin Legum South Africa 196485
The Early Phase
For more than two decades AEC scientists received the strong support of the South African senior leadership 
m its efforts to develop peaceful nuclear explosives Their achievements were discussed m the previous section 
the emphasis here is on the pivotal influence the politicians exerted during this phase The political leadership 
firmly established the foundation for their long term objective of maintaining close and contmumg ties to the 
West It viewed itself more as defending Western interests on the African contment—particularly agamst the 
forces of communism embodied m the Soviet Union The SADF and the technocrats were the benefactor of 
mcreased defense budgets but the focus was on conventional armaments The SADF also initiated a flourishing 
military technology exchange program with Israel during this period—laymg the foundation for future nuclear 
cooperation efforts86
The worldview of South Africa s political leadership (for example the ruling Nationalist Party) came 
sharply mto play during this penod the Nationalist Party aligned itself with the West and actively pursued 
membership m a Western alliance (to mclude NATO) to gam security guarantees 87 South Africa eventually 
succeeded m gaining an alliance of sorts under the 1955 Simonstown Agreement to provide the British Royal 
Navy use of a base near Cape Town m exchange for sales of military equipment to the SADF88 Although 
rebuffed by NATO South Africa s senior leadership were convmced their nation s geostrategic position wealth 
of critical materials and staunch opposition to communism would gam it favor—and military support—from 
the West The party leaders believed these attributes would also allow them to contmue then- domestic policy of 
apartheid and maintain a favorable balance of power m the region 89
What they had not counted on was the dual challenge of nsmg mtemal opposition by the black majority 
led by the African National Congress (ANC) and international ostracism caused by its apartheid policy As the 
ANC gamed power and influence the government mcreased the seventy of its responses and lost mtemational 
support Incidents such as the March 1960 Sharpeville massacre of sixty nme unarmed protesters significantly 
mcreased mtemational opposition to apartheid90
The 1970s added another challenge to the Nationalist Party—eroding regional stability The Apnl 1974 
overthrow of the Caetano regime m Portugal led to the breakup of its colonies m southern Africa The cascadmg 
effect was a secunty threat along South Africa s northeastern border from a pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist 
government m Mozambique Less than a year later the Alvor Accords— mtended to lead to a peaceful transfer of 
power m Angola, Portugal s other colony—broke down almost immediately after they were signed South 
Africa s attempted intervention m the ensumg civil war was unsuccessful and yet another pro Soviet 
government—this one remforced by the presence of 50 000 Cuban troops—was established m a nation bordering 
South Africa to the north
Shifting U S Policy
The Angola experience highlighted what South Africa regarded as lukewarm U S support for its battle agamst 
communism South Africa had intervened m the civil war with the tacit support of Secretary of State Henry 
Kissmger and the tangible support of covert U S funding91 However the United States was forced to 
terminate this support when Congress and the public learned of the covert aid92 Consequently South Africa 
could not sustain the effort without the U S assistance and was forced to withdraw At the same time the 
United States canceled an existmg nuclear fuel supply contract for the SAFARI I reactor To make matters 
worse the United States refused to refund the money South Africa had already paid for the fuel93 These 
activities underscored to the South African leadership the limits of Western support for security and consistent 
economic trade It seemed apparent to the South African leadership that some other means had to be applied to 
secure Western support m times of crisis
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These experiences all occurred concurrently with successful AEC preliminary work on nuclear devices As 
mtemational pressure mcreased over its apartheid policies the Nationalist Party put forth the concept that South 
Africa faced a ‘total onslaught 94 The concept was based on four points the sense of an all out threat to South 
Africa s survival a belief that its enemies are directed by the Soviet Union a feelmg of havmg been abandoned 
by the West and a fear of massive conventional attack 95 From South Africa s perspective it was alone ill 
equipped to meet regional security concerns and bemg unfairly punished by the West for its domestic policies 
despite its staunch anti Communist stand on the African contment
The South African response to the challenges of a total onslaught was the development of a Total 
National Strategy 96 It defined a roadmap for the use of political military diplomatic and economic tools for 
a long term effort to develop effective responses to mtemal and external national security threats The strategy 
resulted m a doublmg m the size of the SADF and the tripling of its defense budget over the latter half of the 
1970s97 Under Defense Mmister P W Botha s guidance the SADF was transformed to meet the new threats 
with the establishment of a Conventional Force and Counterinsurgency and Terrorism Force98 The mtent was 
to counter the growing threat from Soviet supported surrogates along its northern borders and counter increasing 
mtemal ANC terrorism respectively As a final step the peaceful nuclear explosives program was 
contmued—and plans were made for its eventual weapomzation
The great powers which have nuclear weapons have adopted an odd attitude One would have thought that 
it would have been tactically more profitable fo r  them to draw closer a potential member o f the nuclear 
club which South Africa is Their bullying attitude could result in making us a maverick bull in the nuclear 
herd and that is surely not a sound situation from their point o f view South Africa will go its own way 
and its own interests will be decisive
Editorial Beeld 197799
Middle Period 
The Rise of ARMSCOR
As discussed earlier South Africa pursued a peaceful atomic test only to be pressured into aborting it by the 
United States and Soviet Union This situation led to the rise of ARMSCOR as the lead agency for developmg 
South Africa s nuclear deterrent as Prime Mmister Botha transitioned the nuclear device mto a nuclear 
weapon and established the Republic s first nuclear deterrent strategy 100
Initially approved m 1978 it called for a three phase strategy of nuclear deterrence The strategy s focus 
was not on warfighting but rather on creatmg the proper political conditions to mduce favorable Western 
intervention if a cnsis threatened South Africa Accordmg to Aibnght the 1978 strategy was based on the 
following elements
• Phase I was the standing peacetime posture of denying the existence of a South African nuclear 
capability If a crisis ensued and South Africa found itself with its back to the wall it would move to 
the next phase
• Phase II called for covert revelation of its nuclear capability to Western countries (especially the United 
States) If unsuccessful
• Phase III called for an underground test of a nuclear device to demonstrate the nuclear capability 
existed If nations remained unconvinced a contingency existed to conduct an aboveground 
detonation [emphasis added] to demonstrate an operational nuclear weapon capability 101
South African officials deny Phase III implied there was ever any strategy for operational application of 
nuclear weapons 102 Others believe there is evidence mdicatmg the South African senior leadership had given 
strong consideration to the operational use of then- nuclear arsenal For example ARMSCOR officials admitted 
during a 1995 press briefing that the Angolan capital city of Luanda was targeted for a nuclear strike had peace 
talks failed and hostilities broken out agam m 1987 103
Along with the political decision to establish a nuclear strategy the middle phase also spawned what 
Robert Kelley refers to as the second bomb program Kelley notes almost every nation has two nuclear
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programs one visible and the other much less so 104 In the case of South Africa the aborted Kalahari test led 
to the nse of ARMSCOR and its technocrats as the second bomb program ARMSCOR transformed the 
South African program from a fledgling exploratory effort mto a full scale weapomzation and production effort 
It ignored any attempts by the AEC to pursue advanced weapons designs withm any priority until it became a 
means of extendmg the life of the nuclear program Meanwhile the AEC contmued to draw the attention of 
Western intelligence services with its focus on such advanced designs and its proximity to the Y Plant HEU 
production facility 105
ARMSCOR emerged as havmg influence over nuclear matters second only to that of the State Security 
Council Accordmg to David Albnght ARMSCOR exerted tremendous autonomy withm the nuclear 
program On paper ARMSCOR worked for the South African Air Force m developmg nuclear weapons but 
enjoyed unprecedented access to the state president In fact ARMSCOR reportedly expanded the ongmal three 
phase nuclear strategy mto a 30 to 40 page document establishing specific entena and preconditions 
corresponding to each phase of the ongmal strategy 106 ARMSCOR s mtent was to provide a very detailed 
descnption of the specific political military and diplomatic conditions to be achieved at each decision point 
leadmg up to the possible use of nuclear weapons 107
ARMSCOR s mvolvement m developmg South Africa s nuclear deterrent strategy raises serious questions 
about the nature of the strategy Both Mitchell Reiss and James Doyle viewed the ongmal three phase strategy 
as bemg characterized by an air of unreality 108 Another individual familiar with the South African nuclear 
program is convmced the entire strategy was developed well after the fact to obscure what was a haphazard 
decision making process 109 The real bottom line is the strategy targeted the United States not an invading 
Soviet surrogate The objective was to compel U S action to do so required extraordinary means to insure that 
the weapons were secure and no possibility of inadvertent release existed
This provides a strong rationale for why ARMSCOR personnel were uninterested m modifying the ongmal 
weapons design because the focus was on credible possession of a nuclear weapon not its specific yield The 
entena as a credible and reliable deterrent required only that it mduce Western intervention any yield (for 
example anywhere between 0 001 and the desired 10-20 kiloton) would suffice
ARMSCOR s emphasis on arming and safety mechanisms and elaborate precautions m the storage of the 
weapons reflected the strong political influence over the program s implementation The military did not retam 
any day to-day control over the devices they were stored partially disassembled m separate vaults at 
ARMSCOR s Circle facility The vaults could only be opened with the approval of the state president and 
required the codes of at least four officials to gam sufficient access to the vaults to assemble a smgle weapon 110
There is limited information on the military s influence over the nuclear weapon requirements beyond 
ensuring physical electronic compatibility with their Buccaneer aircraft Reportedly the SADF had developed 
some contmgency targeting lists to support the nuclear program 111 Given the program s political emphasis any 
requirement to deliver more than one weapon to generate a response from the West would likely be 
counterproductive There is little indication the military gave the employment of nuclear weapons much 
emphasis although they did begm practicmg nuclear dive toss deliveries as early as 1976 112
The military reportedly did play a leadmg role in coordmatmg clandestine arms and technology transfers 
between South Africa and Israel113 This mcluded the transfer of approximately 50 metric tons of South African 
yellowcake (uranium ore concentrate) m exchange for 30 grams of tntium to support AEC work on boosted 
fission weapons 114 Other exchanges of military technology and work on jomt ventures reportedly mcluded 
technical knowledge acquired from the cancelled Israeli Lavi fighter program to the South African Cheetah 
fighter and the jomt Israeli-South African space program 115 The latter effort provided South Africa with a 
ballistic missile delivery capability using a modified Jencho II missile 116
The AEC scientists were relegated from a position of first to worst m terms of influence over the nuclear 
program They resigned themselves to researching boosted fission weapon and implosion weapon designs for 
which there was no customer and no hope of mcreased funding ARMSCOR did bring several AEC scientists 
over to its Advena Central Laboratories late m 1988 to support its implosion weapon research but the program 
was canceled before much work could be accomplished
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End Phase
Eliminating the Nuclear Weapons
The final phase of the nuclear program began with F W de Klerk s election as president of South Africa As 
had been the case throughout the program the political leadership focused on evaluatmg the utility of the 
nuclear arsenal m meeting its objective of bemg a part of the West By 1989 regional security issues had been 
resolved and the Soviet Union was no longer viewed as bemg the mastermind behmd every challenge to the 
Nationalist Party s authority President de Klerk took frill advantage of this situation m reassessmg the value of 
the nuclear deterrent as a means to achieve their long term ends with respect to the W est117 Unlike the Cold 
War penod the new security situation and mcreased mtemational opposition to apartheid made it clear South 
Africa would face more not less ostracism and economic sanctions if it retamed its nuclear deterrent capability 
Reiss credits President de Klerk s visionary leadership during this penod as pivotal m making the choice to 
abandon nuclear weapons 118
The decime of the nuclear program (and shortly thereafter the ballistic missile program) left ARMSCOR 
m a position of waning military influence as the nuclear stockpile was dismantled It has however attempted to 
increase its commercial success by converting its armament facilities to nonnuclear activities The scientists and 
the military were left to provide limited technical support and security for the route used to transfer the HEU 
from the dismantled weapons back to a secured storage area at the Pelmdaba Nuclear Research Facility 
respectively
A Nuclear Program is Dismantled
South Africa required five years to build its first nuclear device and a total o f  sixteen years to construct its 
six weapon arsenal Ending the program however took less than twenty four months
Mitchell Reiss Bridled Ambition 1979
At no point was the influence of South Africa s political leadership over the nuclear program greater than at its 
termination The transition from a nation determined to sustain its nuclear capability mto one committed to a 
nuclear weapons free zone m Africa reflected a change m means but not ends for its national security strategy 
The facts of the decision making process are straightforward President de Klerk assumed office m 1989 
terminated the program shortly thereafter and South Africa acceded to the NPT m 1991 However the small 
core leadership mvolved m the nuclear program remams reluctant to discuss their specific motivations for 
shifting South Africa s means to achieve its ends m such a short period of time
U S Actions and South Africa’s Reactions
The dismantlement itself was a reflection of how South Africa s leadership—primarily President de 
Klerk—balanced the need to rollback its nuclear capability with the concurrent requirement to radically reform 
its domestic policies In many ways the two issues of nuclear rollback and domestic reform were linked As 
Frank Pabian and Mitchell Reiss note much of the U S nonproliferation efforts focused on South Africa did 
more to isolate rather than engage it to achieve a nuclear rollback 119 A key factor was the United States could 
not completely address the South African nuclear issue because of legal restrictions imposed by Congress to 
punish South Africa for its apartheid policies
As noted earlier the United States largely had to go it alone to enforce nonproliferation sanctions agamst 
South Africa The result was largely ineffective measures to compel South Africa to accept mtemational nuclear 
safeguards One reason for the ineffectiveness of this policy was it sent veiy mixed signals to the government m 
Pretona regarding the true nature of the sanctions 120 In some cases the desired effect was to slow the growth or 
proliferation potential of South Africa s non safeguarded nuclear program On the other hand the United States 
applied restrictions on trade and the exchange of nuclear technology and materials in response to growing 
disapproval of South Africa s policy of apartheid
One of the more telling pomts was the 1978 Nuclear Non Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) The Carter 
administration used this legislation as the justification for refusing to provide nuclear fuel for the SAFARI I 
reactor after South Africa had already paid for the fuel121 According to Pabian this action led South Africa to 
judge the United States as an unreliable supplier and spurred the development of an mdigenous nuclear fuel 
production effort and to some extent the decision to proceed with its nuclear weapons program 122 
Consequently U S policy to minimize proliferation by punishing South Africa for not jommg the NPT 
backfired and resulted m a greater not reduced proliferation risk
The United States may have enacted tough legislation but South Africa merely looked to its European 
suppliers to sustam its nuclear fuel production program and weapons R&D European nations such as France 
Germany and Italy123 contmued to sell equipment to South Africa and are credited with supplying the bulk of 
the equipment needed to support its gun type design and contmued research on advanced weapons Although 
the United States led the way m adoptmg a set of voluntary nuclear export controls under the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group m 1977 it was not until 1992 that dual use equipment was mcluded under export controls 124
The nuclear restrictions initiated under the Carter administration contmued under subsequent 
administrations but a change of emphasis occurred under the Reagan administration The Reagan 
administration promoted the concept of constructive engagement with South Africa that was mtended to 
foster dialogue between Washington and Pretoria However this approach reduced policy emphasis on nuclear 
nonproliferation m exchange for expanded discussion of a way ahead on political reform (for example transition 
to black majority rule) 125 Unfortunately the United States could not afford to reward South Africa for progress 
on political reforms under this approach if nuclear nonproliferation measures were not adopted This resulted m
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a situation where U S nonproliferation policy could not make substantive progress on measures to curtail the 
South African nuclear program from 1976 until 1989 126
South African leadership took a calculated gamble during the Cold War that U S regional security mterests 
m Africa were more important than South Africa s domestic policy shortcomings South African Prune Mmisters 
Vorster and P W Botha were convmced m a situation of East versus West the United States was unwilling to 
give up on South Africa Their identity as part of the West would be sustained Had South Africa operationally 
employed a nuclear weapon agamst surrogate forces some scholars express skepticism about U S willingness to 
come to their aid 127 Yet the potential loss of the region s strategic matenals to pro Soviet forces might have won 
m a battle of mterests between apartheid and mcreased Soviet regional influence As m Larry Bond s novel 
Vortex a U S decision to intervene on South Africa s behalf would likely first require neutralizing South Africa s 
remammg nuclear capability before commencing any decisive operations to repel the mvadmg force
But that was then in today s unipolar world a South Africa m possession of nuclear weapons has 
nothing to gam and everything to lose The nsks far outstrip any meager benefits gamed as either a declared or 
undeclared nuclear state If a nuclear stockpile was a means to securing an end m the 1980s nuclear rollback 
was the means to the end for the 1990s William Long asserts that South Africa s leadership was motivated to 
take the measures it did m the late 1980s to insure the West ciid not totally isolate i t 128 Their desire to be a 
part of the West not collapsing regional security allowed them to take advantage of the nuclear card to gam 
recognition and support from the West When viewed m this context the decision on South Africa s part to 
pursue the development of nuclear weapons—and subsequently rollback that nuclear capability—is more 
plausible and logical than a purely security mterest driven response 129
But nuclear rollback and accession to the NPT alone while perhaps logical in light of the absence of 
regional security threats was insufficient m isolation to achieve South Africa s goal of contmued Western 
identity An NPT compliant South Africa still under the rule of a minority white government practicing 
apartheid could not gam its coveted place m the West Instead mtemational pressures to mcrease the economic 
pam of its pariah status would likely have mcreased
If apartheid without nuclear weapons was considered counterproductive there were clearly concerns about a 
nuclear armed South Africa that reformed its racial policies 13j Concerns over proliferation of nuclear technology 
or weapons to rogue states such as Libya under an ANC led government would have likely generated equally 
heavy pressure to disarm The solution therefore was to conduct the two activities m parallel President de 
Klerk recognized the only way to secure his nation s future íe entity with the West lay m a dual track policy of 
domestic reforms and nuclear rollback Both programs had to move forward m order for South Africa to reap 
the fruits of economic prosperity and greater mtemational cooperation and investment
In the end President de Klerk was faced with a simple clioice Continue the practices of the Botha regime 
or chart a new course m pursuit of a common vision of Western identity for South Africa One means to the 
end via a limited nuclear deterrent capability had run its course with the end of the Cold War It promised no 
economic growth and mcreasmg domestic unrest A second path renounced nuclear weapons and pursued
meaningful dialogue toward a peaceful transition of power to 
changes for the Afrikaner elite but it offered the potential for 
renewed mtemational investment
the black majority The latter meant radical 
greater mtemal stability and mcreased prospects of
President de Klerk is certainly deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize for his courage to make a radical course 
correction m his nation s path Yet m a way he was rewarded for adoptmg a selfish yet entirely pragmatic 
vision of his nation s future consistent with its fundamental mterests 131 There is no doubt he had to tread
lightly m making steady progress to achieve these goals The retirement of key personnel associated with the
South African nuclear program and the secrecy under which the dismantlement proceeded provided the 
opportunity to maximize success The nuclear program s cancellation generated some potentially dangerous 
backlash among those who lost their jobs In one instance sixteen nuclear weapons and ballistic missile 
technicians threatened to sell sensitive nuclear weapons information to the highest bidder unless ARMSCOR 
paid them one million dollars m unemployment benefits 133 In another situation two workers were fired and 
carefully monitored after it was learned they planned to steal nuclear weapons material134 These examples 
highlight the potential proliferation dangers inherent m nuclear rollback and suggest the need for mtemational 
support to minimize these dangers
Lessons Learned and Future U S Policy Implications
South Africa s decision to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear deterrent capability and embrace fully its 
responsibilities as a non nuclear weapon state will guarantee Pretoria an unprecedented place o f honor 
in the evolution o f the international non proliferation regime
Waldo Stumpf South Africa s Nuclear Weapons Program 1995
If nothing else Pretoria s experience underscored how quickly quietly and relatively cheaply nuclear weapons 
can be acquired It also demonstrated an important counter example to the high expectations but low payoff 
observed m the Iraqi nuclear program 135 As several scholars (Albright Doyle Kelley Pabian and Reiss) have 
pomted out every nation is unique in its path to acquiring nuclear weapons and m one rare instance rolling 
back that capability The South African program demonstrated the strong pull national identity exerted over the 
nation s leadership to elect such an extreme approach to achievmg its end of closer ties to the West
The political leadership took advantage of its scientists eagerness to demonstrate South Africa s technical 
prowess at time when the military had no rational operational requirement to pull it toward developing a 
nuclear deterrent This apparent dichotomy was resolved by linking South Africa s nuclear strategy to the 
reaction of key Western nations and not those of its potential adversaries From South Africa s isolated position 
and parochial worldview it made sense However President de Klerk came to power m 1989 under a strategic 
environment diametrically opposed to the one P W Botha had encountered back m 1978 Consequently any 
prospects for a favorable Western response to the existing nuclear strategy were highly unlikely South Africa s 
core beliefs and mterests remamed unchanged but the strategic environment framing those beliefs had changed 
substantially The means to satisfy those mterests had to change and that spelled the end of its nuclear deterrent 
capability
For the future Pretona s nuclear weapons expenence yields some pomts that may prove useful in 
countering proliferation challenges that are likely to worsen before conditions unprove m this post-Cold War 
environment The effects of these recommendations will probably manifest themselves over the long term if 
anything South Africa s rapid nuclear rollback was a welcome exception versus the expected norm m 
nonproliferation policy
Recommendations
Better Enforcement of the Nonproliferation Regime
The mcreasmg level of mtemational controls over nuclear technology has reduced the opportunity for a nation 
without a strong industrial base to follow in South Africa s footsteps 136 Contmued U S emphasis on arms 
control measures and the mtemational nonproliferation regime (NPR) are vital to sustammg momentum for 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) This also means taking a leadmg role m 
ameliorating India s concerns over the CTBT and pursuing the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty 
These measures can only enhance the effectiveness of existmg nonproliferation measures The overall mtent is 
to deny a threshold nation the opportunity to conduct any testmg and eventually restrict access to essential 
warhead material
A critical element of this strategy should address greater information sharing to target the illegal removal of 
nuclear components or fissile materials from Russia and other newly mdependent states Having finally 
initiated the process to address dual use export controls the United States and its allies must take the lead m 
forums such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group to establish a means of exchanging information
Given that the information is made available it also demands the resolve to take action to compel nations 
to accede to the NPR This can mclude policies usmg diplomatic political economic and if required military 
instruments of national power to exert a strong influence on those nations outside the NPR Those same 
instruments can be used to extend favorable economic benefits and security assurances to nations acceptmg
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civilian nuclear safeguards while rolling back any nuclear wea pons programs It also mcludes reassuring our
allies of our renewed commitment to their defense m regions where threshold nations contmue to operate 
outside of the NPR
Failure to See the World
from the Threshold Nation s Perspective
Failure to see the world from the threshold nation s perspective will virtually guarantee failure of U S or 
mtemational nonproliferation efforts directed agamst it A nation s perception of its environment—not the U S 
view—will be crucial to its assessment of the value of nuclear weapons as a means to an end For South Africa 
the equation balanced m favor of nuclear weapons until the weapons became a roadblock on the path to real 
progress m achievmg their fundamental interests United States nonproliferation measures motivated m large 
part by opposition to apartheid did little to address the identity crisis that justified South Africa s nuclear 
deterrent capability during the Cold War The United States must be prepared to understand and engage the 
nations within a region over their core mterests and security concerns to promote regional stability and 
encourage further nuclear rollback 137 This is not at odds with the first recommendation rather it ensures such 
instruments are used for a specific purpose to communicate a desired response by a threshold state
a nation that sees no other viable option to 
destruction will contmue to be perceived as an
Nuclear weapons will remam the com of the realm for 
meetmg its mterests and security concerns Weapons of mass
asymmetric response to an adversary s superior capabilities unless fundamental security mterests can be 
addressed and resolved For example the war of words is heating up as Pakistan and India discuss new 
initiatives for their respective nuclear weapons programs 138 This situation calls for U S intervention either 
bilaterally or m concert with the other nuclear weapons states! to reduce the level of rhetoric between the two 
nations and focus attention on addressing the underlying concerns over national prestige and security
Greater Emphasis on the Environmental and “Opportunity” Costs 
Associated with Nuclear Stockpiles
The United States and other nuclear states must raise the profile o f the tremendous opportunity costs 
associated with the acquisition maintenance and retirement of nuclear weapons Partial estimates for 
environmental clean up of U S nuclear weapons facilities and sites range as low as $30 billion to well more 
than $200 billion 139 South Africa devoted a considerable portion of its mdigenous resources (fiscal technical 
and human) to creating and sustaining its nuclear weapons program and supporting infrastructure More 
importantly a considerable number of its talented scientists engineers and technicians mvested more than two 
decades of work mto a program that diverted their creative energies from peaceful civilian research
Defense Department programs like Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) are now helpmg Russia and newly 
mdependent states of the former Soviet Union deal with the challenges of eliminating nuclear weapons and 
supporting the safety and security of nuclear materials 140 The CTR program could be expanded with 
mtemational support to assist threshold nations m enhancing1 safety and security of nuclear materials and to 
provide economic mcentives to aid m conversion of nuclear weapons related facilities
The bottom Ime is Pretoria s nuclear weapons experience proved it is possible to rollback a nuclear 
deterrent capability A key issue m their development was a lack o f security guarantees from the West as part of 
their core identity The lack of clear priority for either domestic reforms or nuclear safeguards m U S policy 
toward South Africa ultimately limited the effectiveness of nonproliferation efforts This policy confusion 
exacerbated South Africa s sense of isolation and contributed to the nuclear buildup U S export controls did 
not deny South Africa key technology or matenals for their weapons but slowed the program s capability to 
support advanced warhead designs More importantly U S ¡contributions to stabilizing the regional security 
situation altered the strategic environment m such a way to make South Africa s nuclear deterrent irrelevant and 
an impediment to improved mtemational relations
In the future nuclear rollback challenges—and opportunities—require a focus on the regional political 
issues underlying regional security concerns The United States and its allies must sustam a nuclear rollback
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dialogue with nations in the Middle East and South Asia to realistically address their security concerns In 
return India Pakistan Israel Syria Egypt Iran Iraq and others in these regions must be willing to 
thoroughly examine the core mterests motivatmg their pursuit of nuclear weapons For the United States the 
challenge will remam staying the course by sustaining a high priority on regional nonproliferation policies 
The failure to do so could cause the United States to repeat policy missteps that reduced its effectiveness to 
target the RSA nuclear program for an early retirement Nonproliferation goals must be carefully weighed at the 
highest level to ensure subordination to other policy goals does not unduly decrease nuclear rollback 
opportunities or mcrease proliferation dangers
I
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